

Status Quo or Bold Adaptation? Reclaiming the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

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Acknowledgments

This report is part of the Breaking Barriers, Making Peace project led by the European Institute of Peace with support from the German Federal Foreign Office. This 2-year project provides recommendations to policymakers and practitioners on how to address the persistent barriers to women's meaningful participation in peace and political settlement processes. This study explores ways to reshape the WPS agenda's vision and practices to respond to contemporary and future challenges in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding.

This report's findings were informed by three background research papers: (1) "[Confronting the Exclusion of Women in Ethiopia's Peace Processes](#)", (2) "[Navigating Barriers To Women's Participation in Policy Spaces Intersecting with Environmental Peacebuilding](#)" and (3) "[Reclaiming the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Sudan](#)". The findings from the global report are also backed by references included in a [practitioner-friendly compendium of resources](#). The findings are also available in a [policy brief version](#).

The upcoming 25th anniversary of the formal WPS agenda invites reflection and renewed commitment. This report, as well as the background papers and compendium underscore the critical importance of grounding international policy in the lived experiences, knowledge and innovations of women peacebuilders. These findings will help shape more responsive and effective WPS approaches in the years to come.

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Foreword

Women's participation in peace processes improves their quality and the likelihood that outcomes will be successful. Women's absence or marginalisation, whether in preparing for negotiations, shaping agendas, proposing confidence-building measures, or crafting agreements, dramatically reduces the chances of success. Failing to meaningfully integrate women in peace processes is a guarantee for ineffective and unsustainable peace. Confronting the structural challenges to women's active participation is therefore an ethical, political, and societal imperative to which we must rise.

Twenty-five years ago, this was recognised in UN Security Council Resolution 1325, a landmark achievement. Despite colossal efforts by women peacebuilders across every conflict, and the visibility the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has gained globally since then, the transformation it heralded has not been realised. If anything, the WPS agenda is now going into reverse, lost in plain sight.

Why is this, and what can be done about it? Has rhetorical commitment camouflaged the failure to confront the deeply entrenched political, societal, and institutional barriers that continue to block women's influence in peace and political processes? How much is due to the persistent marginalisation of women with different social identities, narrow and siloed implementation efforts, and the ongoing trauma and insecurity many women face? Can we really expect progress without bold adaptation and structural change?

This report asserts that we must not continue implementing the WPS agenda within its current limitations. It does so on the basis of extensive evidence from around the world, drawing on the lived experiences and knowledge of women who have faced violent conflict in places such as Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Sudan - risking their lives, health, and reputations to catalyse and shape peace. It identifies five persistent barriers to women's meaningful participation and analyses twelve promising practices to overcome them, offering concrete recommendations for how each can help advance the WPS agenda, if properly financed and operationalised.

None of this is easy. But let this report be read not as an external critique, but as a commitment by practitioners to strengthen the WPS agenda from within, rooted in feminist principles, radical inclusivity, and decolonial thinking. The time to act - and to act boldly - is now.

Michael Keating

Executive Director, European Institute of Peace

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Executive Summary

This report calls for a critical rethinking of the core principles behind the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda to ensure its continued relevance and effectiveness in the rapidly shifting global context. As the political space for gender equality narrows and WPS commitments are increasingly eroding, the agenda's vision and practices must be adjusted to respond to contemporary and future challenges in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding. Far from being a lost cause, the WPS agenda must be revitalised to address rising militarisation and securitisation, reaffirming its purpose as a transformative framework for inclusive and sustainable peace.

This research draws on interviews; an online survey; case studies conducted in Myanmar, Ethiopia and Sudan; and the authors' own experience and peace practice. The study seeks to better understand the continuing obstacles to WPS implementation – particularly the five barriers identified as preventing women's meaningful participation in conflict prevention and peace processes.

The complexity of these challenges requires new and innovative approaches to WPS implementation. This report distinguishes between principles and practices to explain that many well-meaning practices are ineffective because they do not reflect principles of feminist peace. It highlights core principles that could transform the WPS agenda and assesses 12 effective and promising practices that can be used to navigate participation barriers. Finally, the report suggests concrete actions for policymakers and practitioners to enhance women's meaningful participation in peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

Barriers to and recommendations on women's meaningful participation in peace and conflict resolution

1

Persistent patriarchal power and resistance

What can be done? Inclusive transformation needs shifted power structures within all identity groups, not just adding allies to women's struggles. Gender-responsive conflict resolution requires strategic networking, radically inclusive dialogues, deep information sharing and working with men, marginalised social, religious and economic groups and LGBTQIA+ communities as co-owners of systemic societal transformation.

2

Threats to women's safety and ongoing trauma

What can be done? Addressing risks to women's security and conflict-related trauma requires designing inclusive and trauma-informed responses with culturally and socially appropriate and accessible mental health and psychosocial support. Concurrently, investing in long-term, community-based trauma response initiatives can contribute to holistic approaches to health and social cohesion.

3

Narrow, hierarchical and siloed efforts

What can be done? Human security should be central to Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) and National Action Plans (NAPs). To ensure policy coherence and tackle the root causes of insecurity and injustice, it is essential to integrate FFP and NAPs across diplomatic, trade, development, defence, immigration and security services. Integration should not only be vertical (across ministries) but horizontal (across local, national, and regional levels), and entails embedding intersectional analysis and co-creation with grassroots women's organisations to dismantle systemic inequalities at all scales.

4

Incrementalism, exclusion and marginalisation

What can be done? Gender quotas can be used to remedy historical disadvantage and incremental inclusion. Building critical mass can help move beyond symbolic representation, expediting women into substantive and influential roles. Mixed gender mediation and facilitation teams and quotas should be consistently embedded in all peace processes. Conflict parties should be socialised early-on and enforce women in formal and substantive decision-making roles.

5


Inadequate financial and weak political investment

What can be done? Sub-national and community-led efforts by women and feminist organisations need to be amplified. A radical reparative approach must provide long term quality, flexible, equitable core funding to feminist organisations and movements, and redressing injustice and replacing colonial risk-management frameworks.

1. Introduction

For over a century, women's rights movements have advocated for peace, disarmament and humanitarian action. This activism, grounded in thousands of years of Indigenous women's practices of community conflict resolution, has been crucial in shaping conflict resolution, anti-war and global gender equality policies.¹ Women led pacifist protests before World War I, Nigerian women protested colonial rule in 1929, and Mexican women demonstrated against gender stereotypes in the 1970s. Thirty years after the 1995 Beijing Declaration and 25 years after UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (the first of ten Women, Peace and Security (WPS) resolutions), feminist movements remain a critical force for advancing gender equality and peace.

Policies and international frameworks on WPS have been inconsistently implemented, particularly in conflict-affected areas.² Annual reports from the UN Secretary-General have repeatedly warned of stagnation and regression across key WPS indicators.³ Figure 1 shows that a minority of respondents (29.91 per cent) believe UNSCR 1325 interventions were effective at promoting women's participation.⁴



The WPS agenda risks being further sidelined in the current shifting geopolitical landscape. Ultra-conservative and populist political parties and governments have rolled back commitments to human rights and gender equality, leveraging disinformation, regressive social norms and narrow, rigid faith narratives to support their cause. Governments from Brazil to Rwanda to the United States (U.S.) have undermined women's rights, as well as health and reproductive rights, in the promotion of 'authentic' national cultures and 'traditional' family values. This systemic exclusion disproportionately impacts Black and Indigenous women, women with disabilities, asylum seekers and migrants, and LGBTQIA+⁵ people. A radically inclusive intersectional approach to WPS is therefore needed.⁶

Climate change produces novel challenges for the WPS agenda. When combined with conflict, it creates a reinforcing cycle that disproportionately harms women, undermining their security, resilience and participation in peacebuilding.⁷ As climate shocks deplete natural resources, they exacerbate competition, displacement and instability – intensifying gender inequalities.⁸ Women face increased care burdens, reduced livelihood options and heightened exposure to gender-based violence (GBV), yet remain excluded from decision-making on both climate change and peace processes.⁹ Thus while everyone suffers from climate–conflict dynamics, women suffer more (e.g. in the magnitude of burdens like GBV and care work) and differently (due to structural inequalities that prevent them from coping and participating equally).¹⁰

In this landscape, it is increasingly challenging to ensure the WPS agenda remains prioritised, nuanced, relevant and impactful to the 1 billion people living in areas affected by violent conflict¹¹ and the more than 2.4 billion people living in places where state and non-state forces routinely imprison, harm or kill dissenters with impunity.¹²


Mainstream WPS efforts have sought to enhance women's representation in formal peace processes and protect them from GBV. While WPS goals of participation and protection are critical, they cannot be sustained without conflict prevention via systemic shifts in the patriarchal, colonial and capitalist systems of power that limit women's agency in the first place. The widespread sidelining of the core feminist goal of conflict prevention, achieved by addressing the systemic causes of violence and inequality, has undermined WPS implementation.¹³

Critics of the WPS agenda also highlight that it has been narrowly interpreted through a White, heteronormative, colonial framework and implemented primarily by global north institutions.¹⁴ This approach has excluded many Indigenous, Black, LGBTQIA+ people and non-elite men from mainstream WPS efforts and shifted the WPS agenda away from pursuing transformation and de-colonial, feminist and anti-militarist goals.

This research identifies persistent barriers and uses a traffic light system to highlight promising practices: green indicates established effectiveness, orange signals promise with caveats, and red highlights emerging practices that need further evidence and careful implementation. This system helps nuance and prioritise WPS implementation and presents transferable learning to enhance women's meaningful participation in conflict prevention and peace processes.

Box 1: Practitioner-friendly Compendium of Resources

To complement and expand on the recommendations, principles and practices analysed in this study, many reports referenced in this research, as well as others, have been compiled in a [practitioner-friendly compendium of resources](#). This compendium is designed for international mediation and peacebuilding practitioners – including mediators, facilitators, civil society organisations (CSOs), donors and policy actors who wish to increase women's meaningful participation in peace and political settlement processes. It collates and summarises effective and up-to-date strategies from over 90 publications – particularly by global majority authors.



2.

WPS: lost in plain sight

UNSCR 1325, adopted in October 2000, built on the 1995 Beijing Declaration to inaugurate the WPS agenda. The UN Security Council has since adopted nine additional related resolutions: four focus broadly on advancing participation, while the remaining five concentrate solely on the lacklustre architecture to address sexual violence in conflict by armed actors.¹⁵ Two further UNSCRs have been adopted since 2015; they highlight that the WPS agenda is subject to dispute and dissent globally, particularly by certain UN Member States, some of which have veto power as permanent members of the Security Council.

However, some argue that future resources (time, energy, funding, political capital) should be targeted at the practical implementation of prior resolutions rather than adopting further measures.¹⁶ They advocate focusing on regional and domestic institutions and engaged states to progress the WPS agenda. Such an approach would include coordination and establishing deeper connections to community initiatives and local activists who have called out ineffective WPS approaches and led renewed feminist action.¹⁷ Yet, updating the normative framework is unlikely to gain support in the current geopolitical context.

“The women, peace and security agenda is being ripped apart in front of our eyes because nobody in the developing world believes this...anymore. They’re just like, ‘Forget it. Don’t talk to us about your great so-called commitment to liberal values’. The genocide [in Palestine] was live streamed. Don’t tell us you want women at the negotiating tables. We don’t buy that.”¹⁸

Continuing to uncritically ground the WPS agenda in documents developed 25 years ago will contribute to its ineffective implementation. The agenda should therefore be adapted to current needs and challenges – including ongoing struggles for decolonisation, continued imperialism, rampant misinformation and disinformation (which destabilise peace efforts and worsen gender inequalities), the rise of cyber warfare and militarisation, and climate change. It should also incorporate international lessons learned and good practices. The global pushback against further normative advances in gender equality is a sign of increased geopolitical fragmentation and contestation. It reflects the shrinking space for global human rights and freedoms, and places significant pressure on available resources and political will to implement the WPS agenda.

These challenges are exacerbated by increasing tensions between feminist and authoritarian approaches to peace and security, financing and normative standards – all of which make it more difficult to implement the WPS agenda. Smarter joined-up efforts are required. Increasing emphasis has been placed on working across multiple sectors, connecting with disability and LGBTQIA+ rights as well as racial and climate justice movements, working intergenerationally, and using creative, explicitly feminist approaches. However, many institutions continue to engage in incrementalist and technical approaches, which often fail to address the underlying causes of gender inequality and conflict.

BOX 2: Reflecting on the 2015 Global Study on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325

The Global Study evaluated the first 15 years of WPS implementation, highlighting good practices, gaps, challenges, emerging trends and priorities for action. It found that the gap between the robustness of the normative frameworks and the weakness of implementation derives from gender inequality, institutional and attitudinal barriers, and a lack of political will, accountability and resources. The study highlighted that mediation and conflict resolution actors remain resistant to including women; such actors evaluate success based on effectiveness rather than inclusiveness. It also noted vast discrepancies in states’ policy commitments and their funding for WPS initiatives.¹⁹

In 2025, 99 per cent of gender-related international aid fails to reach women’s rights and feminist organisations directly.²⁰ Three-quarters of the funding never leaves development agencies, and the vast majority of the remaining money is provided to large CSOs and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs).²¹ These persistent challenges are driven by decision-makers’ widespread and ongoing reservations about backing women’s rights and feminist movements as well as low levels of risk taking to prioritise inclusion in mediation and peace processes. The result is that huge swathes of peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts fail to integrate gender equality.²²

While there have been few formal impact evaluations of the WPS agenda, periodically reviewing relevant research on the topic can illuminate good practices.²³ Most of the available analyses on women's participation focus on the barriers preventing them from influencing decision-making; few detail how these barriers have been mitigated or overcome, or the conditions and practical actions taken that have generated change.²⁴ To fill this gap, this report identifies the core persistent barriers to women's meaningful participation; assesses the practices, principles, and conditions found to contribute to the success or failure of women's meaningful participation; and highlights transferable learning for policymakers and practitioners.

This global review seeks to help practitioners and policymakers advance the WPS agenda – not just in the global north, but also in global majority decision-making spaces and in women-led networks and WPS organisations in conflict-affected contexts. The report builds on the understanding that women's meaningful participation involves not only their physical presence, but also having the power to shape decisions and drive transformative change. Meaningful participation entails (1) being present to create and seize opportunities; (2) deploying agency through agenda setting and coalition building; (3) strengthening women's knowledge and confidence; and (4) exerting influence through lived experience.²⁵ Each aspect of meaningful participation corresponds to practical actions:²⁶

Figure 2


Elements of Meaningful Participation



Source: This builds on the original graphic developed by UN Women (2018) and Cate Buchanan (2021).

This research draws on three case studies from **Myanmar**, **Ethiopia** and **Sudan** undertaken in parallel to this research which included interviews and focus group discussions with 129 people (102 women, 24 men, 2 non-binary people, 1 transgender person).²⁷ It also analyses data from an online survey of 220 WPS practitioners and policymakers (180 women, 36 men, 3 non-binary people) conducted between November

2024 and February 2025 in Arabic, English, French and Spanish.²⁸ This survey was conducted in parallel to 16 interviews with leading WPS practitioners (13 women, 3 men), primarily from global majority contexts.²⁹



3.

Core barriers to women's meaningful participation


The research, including the results of the global survey in Figure 2, identified five problems that continue to stymie women’s contributions to conflict prevention and peace promotion.³⁰

- 1. Persistent patriarchal power and resistance
- 2. Threats to women’s safety and ongoing trauma
- 3. Narrow, hierarchical and siloed efforts
- 4. Incrementalism, exclusion and marginalisation
- 5. Inequitable financial and weak political investment

The remainder of this report discusses each barrier in turn and provides examples of addressing or challenging them.

Figure 3

What do you consider the most persistent barriers to women’s participation in conflict resolution and peace processes in the context/s you work in?



Persistent patriarchal power and resistance



“ Since all strategies have to first be about undermining patriarchy, calling for women’s participation in peace processes isn’t enough. The peace process itself is patriarchal...Once women enter those spaces, they are still bound by the patriarchal nature of the process.”³¹

Persistent patriarchal dynamics underpin resistance to the WPS agenda. These are woven through international and national peacebuilding and conflict resolution institutions and their leaders; they endure in local-level peacebuilding and civil society groups, in homes and within families.³² Interviewees highlighted the lack of political will and resistance to the WPS agenda at all levels of decision-making.³³ This review highlighted three major drivers of this institutional resistance.

First, many view the WPS agenda – and feminist peace more broadly – as a Western, rights-based framework that is not relevant – or worse, contravenes social or cultural norms. This framing overlooks the historical activism of many global majority women to further the WPS agenda. It also fails to recognise the work of WPS advocates from Papua New Guinea to Uganda to Afghanistan who have carefully translated the global WPS frameworks into local terminology and contexts and worked closely with customary and faith leaders and institutions to progress its implementation.

Second, WPS advocates are perceived as lacking pragmatism and the ability to navigate the difficult realities of war, uneven political settlements and the pressing need to end extreme violence by any means possible. This argument does not regard the WPS agenda as inherently political even though its goals of sustained peace and gender equality require the active transformation of unequal systems of power and the structural causes of violence, which cannot be achieved solely through technocratic means.

Third, many male-dominated peacebuilding and conflict resolution institutions position themselves as neutral mediators. ‘Neutrality’ is used to explain why they will not push for gender-inclusive outcomes unless male-dominated conflict parties are proposing them. This positioning fails to acknowledge the interests, needs, and positions of those institutions and individuals, as well as their donors. As one participant explained, **“I think people don’t see WPS as relevant to them. It’s a kind of soft women’s**

agenda that’s not interesting. WPS is something to do with some civil society women. In fact it is completely relevant to all aspects of peacebuilding – whether it’s leading up to conflict resolution or post-conflict peacebuilding.”³⁴

The disproportionate burden of unpaid care work also frequently undermines women’s participation. Care burdens are not merely personal challenges; they are systemic obstacles that restrict mobility, reduce the time available for civic engagement and exclude women from formal peace processes. The unequal division of household labour overburdens women (especially those with low socio-economic status) with domestic chores, and reproductive and care responsibilities. Conflict and climate change intensify this structural barrier.

In areas experiencing prolonged drought or environmental degradation, women must walk further to access water and fuel, exacerbating their time poverty and physical exhaustion. Women also provide most of the care for those affected by climate disasters and conflicts. In Myanmar, women in conflict-affected regions such as Chin and Kayah have reported that climate disasters – landslides, floods and crop failures – have increased their caregiving responsibilities, forcing them to prioritise immediate survival over political participation.³⁵

Patriarchal resistance to women’s participation in peace and security processes is deeply embedded in formal and informal systems, structures and institutions: it manifests not only in overt exclusion, but also in restrictive norms, routines and decision-making mechanisms that govern public life. These structures are not neutral; they reflect and reproduce gender hierarchies that systematically devalue women’s contributions and limit their access to leadership. In Sudan, gender inequalities were systemised through institutionalised policies and practices, particularly the Public Order and Personal Status Laws and the Islamist as well as Arabist “Civilization Project”³⁶ that sought to consolidate a patriarchal way of life and deepen political divisions.³⁷ These measures limited women’s agency and stifled their voices in public and private, excluding them socially, economically and politically.³⁸ In 2019, women pro-democracy protestors were beaten and detained, and accused of violating Sudan’s Public Order Laws governing their public presence and dress.

In Ethiopia, the Abegar (elders' councils) in regions such as Wollo and Borana are central to local conflict resolution. Yet these customary institutions are almost exclusively male; their rules of engagement, timing and venues implicitly exclude women. Even when women are informally recognised as mediators or peacebuilders within their communities, they are rarely granted institutional legitimacy or access to decision-making forums. This exclusion is reinforced by broader policy and legal frameworks that lack accountability mechanisms to ensure women's inclusion.³⁹


There is also evidence that some interventions to support women's political participation have caused or exacerbated intimate partner violence.⁴⁰ This highlights the predominantly male backlash and violent resistance to changing gender norms at the individual and household levels – and the urgent need for locally led, culturally responsive WPS implementation.⁴¹

How does this barrier operate in practice?

In Myanmar, staff of male-dominated international entities and national NGOs – even those that identify inclusion as a core issue – are largely reluctant to jeopardise their political capital and reputation by challenging regressive norms. This manifests as silence on gender equality and women's participation when engaging ethnic armed organisations in particular, as they do not want to risk the connections they have made with such groups. These staff often lack confidence in the rationale, evidence or benefits of women's participation and understand inclusion as solely related to ethnicity. Unconscious biases often make them reluctant to request women's participation, which exacerbates their systemic exclusion.⁴²

Preserving and protecting the space for women's rights and gender equality is now more important than ever. Authoritarian politics are on the rise. Women's rights organisations and peace promotion at all levels face increasing restrictions, which limit constructive dialogue, access to information and inclusive conflict resolution.⁴³ The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated democratic backsliding with the introduction of emergency laws and policies.⁴⁴ Many women's rights organisations were forced to scale back or shut down due to restrictive public health measures and funding cuts, further shrinking the civic space and silencing critical voices in peace and gender advocacy. In many contexts, these measures curtailed the operations of women's rights organisations, delayed critical gender-responsive policies and diverted resources away from gender equality initiatives.

Women peacebuilders are often active in informal and under-recognised leadership roles at the forefront of crisis response. When responding to conflicts, disasters and social upheaval, they face heightened barriers in accessing public platforms and influencing decision-making processes – reinforcing patriarchal power structures.⁴⁵



Threats to women's safety and ongoing trauma



Participants stressed that women, girls and non-binary people are often subject to grave danger when they participate in peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes. One participant noted, ***“People can’t engage in the sort of activism, the work that is required, when they are at such extreme risk. They’ve got very intense personal risks.”***⁴⁶

The WPS goal of protection can sometimes reinforce narratives that women are victims rather than agents of change. A narrow focus on protection may fail to acknowledge the sources of the dangers to women. This in turn can cause security risks to be cited as a justification to concentrate on safeguarding and limit women’s participation in political spaces – thus overlooking the underlying power structures that make those spaces unsafe and preventing responses to mitigate the risks by improving (gendered) security efforts.

Conflict-related sexual violence and trauma, technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV), reproductive and economic violence, and other forms of GBV are widespread and affect women’s ability and willingness to meaningfully participate in peacebuilding and conflict resolution.⁴⁷ Women who challenge patriarchal norms by taking on leadership roles are frequently targeted with harassment, threats and violence. These deterrents reinforce the perception that politics and security remain male-dominated spaces in which only a minimal women’s presence is tolerated.

TFGBV includes cyberstalking, defamation, doxing, harassment, revenge porn and online abuse, which can include death and rape threats and the non-consensual sharing or threatened distribution of intimate images, including deepfake ‘pornography’ created or altered by generative artificial intelligence (AI). TFGBV perpetuates harmful stereotypes, cultural and social norms, and patterns of violent masculinity that discriminate against women and girls, including those with intersecting marginalised identities. It threatens the safety, security and well-being of women, youth and LGBTQIA+ people and poses new challenges to WPS efforts designed to prevent and respond to violence against women.⁴⁸

The growing backlash against women’s rights, the rapid rise of AI and the increasing influence of the ‘manosphere’ – misogynistic content seeping into

mainstream culture – are fuelling harmful perceptions of women and contributing to a rise in violence.⁴⁹

In digital spaces, activists, progressive parliamentarians and candidates, journalists and peacebuilders face attacks designed to discredit and intimidate them.⁵⁰ The vast majority (85 per cent) of women globally have witnessed or experienced online violence,⁵¹ and 42 per cent of women parliamentarians have experienced “extremely humiliating or sexually charged” images of themselves shared online.⁵²

How does this barrier operate in practice?

The 2022 Kenyan national election was marked by high levels of online hate speech, misinformation and disinformation. These attacks included discriminatory comments targeting women candidates’ gender, tribes or ethnic groups, or religion or sexual orientation. Online attacks portrayed men as more fit for leadership and women leaders as inherently untrustworthy, unlikable, unqualified and unintelligent. Online violence spread offline: women candidates reported harassment, intimidation, violence and death threats, and their supporters were physically abused and intimidated.⁵³

Conflict-related trauma – exacerbated by suffering decades of violence and political detention, surviving attacks and losing close family members – discourages women’s participation in peace processes and political decision-making.⁵⁴ Participants described experiencing survivor’s guilt as well as intergenerational and vicarious trauma, and recounted episodes of mental distress, anxiety, depression and attempted suicide. Furthermore, involvement in peace processes and political decision-making can compound trauma and stress.

Participants also highlighted that there was minimal culturally appropriate and gender-responsive mental health and psychosocial support available.⁵⁵ Addressing the legacy of conflict-related trauma has received limited attention in peace agreements, the WPS agenda and post-war peacebuilding, which limits women’s ability to fully engage.

Narrow, hierarchical and siloed efforts



The WPS agenda calls for strengthening women's participation in all aspects of peace and conflict prevention work. Yet multilateral and bilateral organisations often narrowly concentrate on getting women to engage in formal Track 1 political processes. This approach has created a hierarchy in which women's leadership and influence in other areas of society is often viewed as less valuable; women who work on peace and security in informal and community settings are perceived as less able to leverage power for influence and impact. WPS interventions are thus often narrow or siloed, and do not seek to overcome the underlying obstacles to women's meaningful participation.

Women remain mostly excluded from Track 1 peace processes. In 2023, they made up only 9.6 per cent of negotiators, 13.7 per cent of mediators, and 26.6 per cent of signatories to peace and ceasefire agreements; the proportion of women signatories drops to 1.5 per cent if Colombia's agreements are excluded.⁵⁶ Women's involvement in peace negotiations (in positions of influence and power) is positively correlated with comprehensive agreements that reference provisions proposed by women, but does not necessarily equate to policy or legal protections for women.

The token representation of women in peace negotiations is insufficient to ensure the resulting agreement is gender responsive.⁵⁷ The women chosen to participate are often elite, from high-status ethnic or clan groups, highly educated and urban. Or they are chosen because of their role in government, although men hold the majority of well-resourced and influential ministerial portfolios.⁵⁸

Research participants in Sudan and Myanmar also explained that women's participation is often a hypocritical signal to international donors, done only to receive international kudos and funding. The focus on empowering some women also often results in a missed opportunity to collaborate with men and boys as powerholders and co-workers for, and beneficiaries of, gender justice.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, three-quarters of peace processes actively involve women in informal and community-level peacebuilding.⁶⁰ By narrowly investing in Track 1 negotiations with (mostly male) political and military elites, multilateral and bilateral institutions often fail to

support Track 2 and 3 processes that involve women from diverse backgrounds actively brokering peace and sustaining community resilience.

The presence of more mediators and a more gender-equal negotiating team correlates with the use of more varied mediation strategies and increases the chance of reaching peace agreements. Despite this evidence and their commitment to WPS, UN regional organisations and states are still less likely than NGOs to deploy women as conflict mediators.⁶¹

Changing this dynamic is important and challenging. As one interviewee stated: ***"The very nature of the peace process itself is patriarchal, making women's inclusion tokenistic."***⁶² This underscores the deeply embedded structural resistance to diverse groups of women meaningfully participating, which further perpetuates their marginalisation. Participants highlighted that despite women's leadership in parallel sectors, including climate and the environment, academia and the private sector – which nurtures their leadership and topical skills and builds networks and coalitions – they rarely receive support from international organisations.⁶³

WPS work is siloed in many multilateral, bilateral and national-level institutions. For example, efforts to progress transitional justice, constitutional and land reform, humanitarian protection and regulate the arms trade are separate, located in different institutions with limited cross-monitoring and accountability for progress.⁶⁴ As one participant noted: ***"You've got the people doing WPS, you've got the people doing governance, and then if you're thinking of the UN structures, you have the DPPA [UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs] people who are actually doing peace negotiations and for them [WPS] is a limited space that they don't particularly want to engage in."***⁶⁵

Although the European Union's (EU) implementation of the WPS agenda is framed as a central pillar of its foreign policy, there are significant gaps in practice, particularly in terms of coherence, impact and local relevance. The EU's Gender Action Plan III (GAP III) has ambitious goals, yet critical evaluations highlight that a lack of policy coordination leads to fragmented efforts across sectors and countries.⁶⁶ The EU's reliance on a top-down bureaucratic approach often overlooks the complex intersectional barriers that

women face, which makes it harder to adapt EU policies to specific cultural and political contexts.

Despite strong rhetoric, the EU's WPS implementation has been uneven; it tends to prioritise technical, institutional solutions over transformative political changes, which has limited the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of its efforts. A more flexible, context-specific approach is needed that better aligns with the lived experiences and needs of women in conflict-affected areas.

Siloing affects WPS policy coherence and stymies efforts to identify and transform the deeper structural drivers of gender violence and inequality. One participant explained, ***"The failure to name the actors driving conflict – whether economic or geopolitical – limits the WPS agenda's ability to hold power to account."*** They added, ***"There's tremendous incoherence between national action plans, regional resolutions, and other [disarmament, peace and security] campaigns."***⁶⁸ WPS policy incoherence is particularly egregious in countries with FFPs and/or NAPs that continue to sell arms to entities engaging in conflict and human rights violations.

This policy incoherence is partly a failure of the UN and related multilateral and national architectures to connect the WPS agenda with the triple nexus – an integrated approach to all peace, development and humanitarian efforts – and the limited funding and resourcing available for implementation. One participant said, ***"The WPS agenda is being marginalised within the triple nexus."***⁶⁹ It also highlights the disconnect between the deeper, transformative, anti-militaristic feminist agenda that originally inspired the creation of the WPS agenda and its current toothless iteration.

How does this barrier operate in practice?

In the UN-coordinated peace negotiations in Yemen, the two main conflict parties and Saudi Arabian mediators have strongly resisted the inclusion of women and civil society groups. Only 4 per cent of negotiators in the 2018 peace talks were women, and no women participated in 2019. Where women did engage, their presence was seen as tokenistic. Yet Yemeni women have been active in ending water and land conflicts, conducting relief projects, and negotiating prisoner exchanges and the opening of humanitarian corridors. They operate with limited funding and technical support, and channels between Track 1 negotiations and these organisations are not used systematically.⁶⁷



Barrier 4

Incrementalism, exclusion and marginalisation



Recent work in this area has advocated applying an intersectional focus on WPS issues. This means identifying the differences among women, men and non-binary people based on race, class, disability, sexual orientation or other social identities; understanding how these intersecting identities and historical disadvantages shape their experiences of violence and insecurity; and addressing the causes of discrimination and exclusion.⁷⁰

Kimberlé Crenshaw's original vision of intersectionality examined how the interconnectedness of social identities shapes individuals' experiences of oppression or privilege.⁷¹ An effective intersectional approach must address historical disadvantages by transforming policies, laws or structures rooted in colonial domination, racial hierarchies and economic inequality. Although global majority scholars and practitioners advocate this radical and holistic approach, intersectionality has only been integrated into the WPS context in limited ways.⁷² This has compounded the invisibility of marginalised men and LGBTQIA+ people and reinforced differences between women, without addressing the intersecting forms of discrimination they experience.⁷³

For example, NAPs in Colombia (2024), Mexico (2021), Germany (2021), South Africa (2020) and the Philippines (2017) reference intersectionality – most often to highlight the compounding of marginalisation and the vulnerabilities of different groups of women to emphasise that women are not homogenous. Unfortunately, this use of intersectionality continues to depict groups of women / men / non-binary people as separate. This approach fails to highlight overlapping systems of exclusion or to make the most of opportunities to treat men as co-workers for gender equality and sustain feminist coalitions and networks to achieve collective WPS goals.

WPS language and terminology continues to be considered exclusionary in several global majority contexts, which prevents many women from fully engaging. One participant explained, ***“English has become the dominant language for policy work, excluding communities that speak local languages.”***⁷⁴ By preferencing dominant languages and excluding marginalised voices, WPS initiatives can thus replicate existing inequities.

It is also difficult to translate the technical language of UN resolutions to local policies and laws and then into action and results.⁷⁵ In addition, words such as 'gender equality' and 'feminism' are not always viewed as culturally or socially contextualised and can be regarded as colonial concepts used by outsiders to force change. These terms are not perceived to value Indigenous or local knowledge or customary relationships.⁷⁶

Rejection and regression take many forms. Under the US Trump Administration, policies and rhetoric have targeted inclusion and intersectional approaches including gender, Indigenous and racial justice movements. This backlash undermines the WPS agenda by obscuring the structural drivers of inequity, restricting funding for gender equality and WPS-focused initiatives, and weakening foreign policy and domestic support for peacebuilding.⁷⁷

One study participant highlighted that many intersectional approaches ***“tend to focus on identities rather than the systems of oppression themselves”***.⁷⁸ This failure to identify and transform the causes of inequity dilutes the impact of WPS interventions. For example, a WPS project may collect data on various personal characteristics of an individual involved (e.g. a young, displaced woman with disabilities), but it may fail to identify (and act to dismantle) the interlayered, structural barriers that prevent this individual and other diverse groups of people from meaningfully participating.

How does this barrier operate in practice?

Sudan's first NAP on WPS (2020–2022) states the need for an inclusive approach, yet its consultative process and implementation often fail to address the situation of the large number of women who live in rural, low socio-economic and conflict-affected communities.⁷⁹ WPS initiatives and consultations often occur in urban centres and do not consider the needs of diverse women across Sudan, who may lack access to formal education or policy networks. This reinforces a system in which WPS participation is limited to elite, urban women.⁸⁰

The other major challenge is that peacebuilding and conflict resolution institutions tend to tokenise intersectionality and have learned how to 'get by' using two main tactics. The first is that policymakers and practitioners who conduct gender and conflict analyses claim to use an intersectional approach to better understand the differentiated experiences of gender and other social groups in conflict contexts. However, they rarely use this nuanced information to rigorously ensure women's influence or to overcome the barriers to inclusion.⁸¹

In a second tactic, diverse groups are often not involved until the later stages of a peace or political process. There is evidence that such incremental approaches are at best an ineffective tactic and, at worst, a successful blocking strategy that consolidates gender inequality. Societal inclusion of these groups is more an exception than the rule.⁸² Peace negotiations usually start with elite, male-dominated armed groups and mediators who embed women's exclusion by saying they will be included at a 'later' stage, but rarely act on this.⁸³

Intergenerational tensions lead younger and older generations of women to pursue different strategies and priorities on the direction and focus of the WPS agenda. Younger women – driven by their lived experiences of global challenges such as climate change, digital technology and economic inequality – emphasise the need for holistic, inclusive, and intersectional approaches to peace and security. Older generations often concentrate on state-centric and institutional approaches and embedding foundational WPS principles.⁸⁴ Younger women in Myanmar, Sudan and Ethiopia highlighted how they draw on decolonial and holistic notions of security and peace for their work – but that these approaches often clash with the views of older WPS advocates.⁸⁵ These intergenerational tensions can prevent women from building strong, united and inclusive peace movements.



Inequitable financial and weak political investment





Figure 4

What are the primary and secondary sources of funding for your WPS-specific work?



One of the most significant challenges is the systemic underfunding of women's rights and civil society organisations, which keeps them weak and dependent. The 2015 Global Study highlighted the dire levels of global funding for women and girls, and for the WPS agenda more specifically.⁸⁶ Little has changed since then. Research participants reported that bilateral donors and UN agencies provide the majority of funding for their WPS-specific work (Figure 4).⁸⁷ However, in 2021–2022, only 0.3 per cent of all bilateral aid to conflict-affected regions was allocated to support women-led groups and women's rights organisations and movements.⁸⁸ Fewer than 1 per cent of gender equality official development assistance supports women's rights organisations and feminist movements.⁸⁹

Although these organisations play a crucial role in implementing WPS initiatives at the community level, donors are frequently reluctant to risk assisting such small, locally embedded actors.⁹⁰ This reflects a broader trend in international development and peacebuilding in which funding is disproportionately allocated to large, well-established organisations (usually based in the global north) rather than directly supporting the people most closely embedded in conflict-affected communities.⁹¹


A participant explained that quality flexible funding for sub-national organisations is required: “[The] **groundwork to all of it is ongoing sustained support for women's local level peacebuilding organisations or women's rights organisations which provides them with...the sustained capacity to engage**”.⁹² The global north's emphasis on scalability, formalised bureaucratic structures and financial accountability mechanisms disadvantages sub-national initiatives that may lack the administrative capacity to meet stringent donor requirements, even though they are best positioned to effect real change on the ground.

How does this barrier operate in practice?

In Sudan, inconsistent donor funding has significantly hindered sub-national women-led peacebuilding initiatives, particularly following the coup and ongoing war. Women's organisations that had previously received support for peacebuilding found themselves with diminished resources, which prevented them from sustaining long-term initiatives. International donors frequently fail to provide flexible and sustained funding to allow organisations to work beyond short-term crisis responses.⁹³

Figure 5


What is the typical duration of funding for your WPS-specific work?



Instead of providing flexible, long-term financial support that allows organisations to build institutional capacity, donors often fund women's rights organisations to engage in activity-based, short-term projects.⁹⁴ Research participants highlighted that the majority of funding (67.65 per cent) is provided for less than 18 months (Figure 5).⁹⁵ This short-term focus makes it difficult for women-led peacebuilding efforts to maintain momentum, retain skilled personnel or scale up their impact; they are forced to spend significant time and resources securing and reporting on grants rather than seizing windows of opportunity,⁹⁶ growing feminist movements, undertaking data collection and analysis to reframe policy issues, and much more to realise transformative change.

Even when funding is available, it is not always allocated equitably. Certain groups – particularly women with disabilities, displaced women, and women from ethnic or faith minority communities – struggle to access funding due to historical disadvantage, systemic biases, and limited gender-disaggregated data available on their specific needs and challenges. One participant described this challenge: ***"The resources are few. So, how much resources for the women? How much resources for the transgender people? How much resources for the black women? That type of discussion is important."***⁹⁷

Without political will, WPS remains a peripheral issue. Without recognition of its structural importance, it continues to be underfunded and politically sidelined – preventing it from meaningfully addressing the root causes of conflict, exclusion and GBV. These financial, data and political barriers create a self-reinforcing cycle that limits the transformative potential of WPS initiatives.



4.

Promising practices to transcend barriers

This section explores the application of critical principles underlying the WPS agenda: promoting women's meaningful participation in peace and security processes, protecting women's rights during and after conflict, preventing conflict and GBV, and integrating gender perspectives into all peace and security efforts. Core principles of gender equality writ large include addressing historical disadvantage, equity, intersectionality, accountability and representation. Finally, core principles in peace promotion include non-discrimination, respect, inclusivity, impartiality, local ownership, justice and sustainability.

The distinction between principles and practices is important in the WPS agenda, as many well-meaning practices are inefficient – or even fail – because they are not grounded in principles or contradict principles of feminist peace. Principles are the constant values or beliefs that guide thinking and decision-making within the WPS. Practices are the concrete actions, methods or techniques used to implement these principles in various contexts and achieve the desired outcomes. Practices can vary depending on the context, while principles should remain relatively constant.



4.1 Core Principles

4.1.1 Radical Inclusion

“**The real problem is very deep and structural. The real problem is there are some groups that have been benefiting...from this existing hierarchical system for decades, and they just don't want to give up that privilege. They are resisting the system to change.**”⁹⁸

Intersectionality in the WPS context requires recognising and acting on how gender intersects race, religion, class, disability, sexual orientation and other identities to shape experiences of conflict and insecurity as well as involvement in peacebuilding. It is a lens that illuminates vulnerabilities and capabilities, and counters exclusion.⁹⁹ Historically, WPS frameworks have often prioritised elite, urban and heterosexual women; many have not felt ‘seen’ or ‘heard’ and have experienced pressure to hide parts of their identity. Thus vital perspectives, data and intelligence have been overlooked or not fully explored in processes that are replete with invisible power dynamics and signals.

Radical does not mean ‘extreme’ or ‘outrageous’, but rather a process of understanding and seeking to transform the root causes of a system, structure or phenomenon.¹⁰⁰ Radical inclusion or intersectionality goes beyond simply adding more diverse voices to decision-making tables; it aims to fundamentally redefine who is considered a legitimate peace actor and challenge the exclusionary systems that have long governed conflict resolution and security policies.¹⁰¹

Beyond gender identity, several initiatives have successfully embedded radical intersectional approaches by incorporating racial, ethnic and Indigenous perspectives into peacebuilding, climate justice and governance reform.¹⁰² Other efforts include integrating the views and needs of people living with disabilities, often the largest single minority in post-war contexts.¹⁰³ According to one participant, “Women in Nepal came together across ethnic and caste identities to influence the constitutional reform process.”¹⁰⁴ This type of intersectional movement building across racial, ethnic and caste lines

demonstrates the need to simultaneously break down gendered, racialised and other barriers to participation.

WPS implementation skews towards a narrow set of stakeholders, primarily led by states and international organisations, which can silo efforts. As one participant noted, “**The agenda is set by global actors, and it often does not reflect the priorities of the people actually affected.**”¹⁰⁵ Women are sometimes present during decision-making but lack the collective influence needed to bring about broader systemic change. In response, women in civil society have successfully advocated for decades to be involved in peace processes. For example, women’s networks secured roles for Liberian women in the Accra peace talks in 2003.

Radical inclusion or intersectionality in the WPS agenda requires dismantling entrenched biases about who is considered a peace actor. This definition should be broadened beyond traditional spaces dominated by political elites, peace and security professionals, diplomats and state security actors to include those who are central to shaping and sustaining peace on the ground, such as women from refugee communities, rural activists and Indigenous leaders. This approach must also address the heightened risks these more marginalised groups face by tailoring security and safeguarding provisions to allow them to meaningfully participate.

How does this mean in practice?

In Colombia, detailed efforts have been undertaken to integrate LGBTQIA+ priorities and perspectives into WPS frameworks, moving beyond binary gender categories to recognise the distinct security needs and peacebuilding contributions of trans, non-binary and queer individuals.¹⁰⁶ Demands to include gender-diverse communities in the country’s peace process created societal tensions that jeopardised the referendum on the process but created strong alliances between LGBTQIA+ and feminist peacebuilding organisations.

These partnerships have been used to create Colombia's first NAP, which incorporates LGBTQIA+ rights, thus successfully broadening the WPS agenda to keep more people secure and recognise greater diversity in experiences of conflict.¹⁰⁷

Radical inclusion also involves shifting the power dynamics rather than merely increasing the number of representatives of marginalised groups. It requires critically examining and adapting the processes, systems and structures that perpetuate exclusion through inequitable funding, poor-quality extractive relationships, shallow political analysis, misunderstanding who holds expertise and knowledge, whose perspectives are prioritised and who is deemed an expert. It also entails addressing overlapping systems of oppression, including international actors' role in creating and perpetuating the conditions of exclusion. For example, feminist funding models allow movements and organisations to make the most of rare windows of opportunity and set strategic (rather than activity-based) goals.

4.1.2 Decolonialism

“African feminists who think about peace also think about colonialism and the ways in which debt structures perpetrate the conditions of conflict. If you cannot think about those things holistically, you cannot begin to do anything about specific conflicts.”¹⁰⁸

Colonial logic and mindsets permeate the international development, peacebuilding and humanitarian sectors.¹⁰⁹ Decolonial feminism recognises that the legacies of colonisation disrupt economic, political and social patterns, gender relations, and Indigenous knowledge systems in communities and societies.¹¹⁰ Decolonialism within WPS challenges the dominance of White, Western feminist paradigms, international donor priorities and top-down governance models. It instead advocates locally driven, historically informed, and structural change to the systems and processes of peace and security.¹¹¹ A central critique of the WPS agenda is that it does not adequately centre women's agency in conflict-affected regions.¹¹²

Many WPS policies and programmes reflect Western feminist frameworks that prioritise legal and institutional reforms as well as parliamentary representation or professionalised, report-driven

models of advocacy, while neglecting Indigenous, informal, and community-based leadership and approaches to gender justice and peace. As one participant explained, ***“If your feminism is not based in an analysis of inequality, of power dynamics, or the legacies of colonialism, then your feminism is [questionable] and people are just going to call you out for it. It's going to be [White] feminism only.”¹¹³***


Decolonising WPS acknowledges that women's resistance, activism and leadership in conflict settings often do not conform to Western feminist narratives. Many women's movements in the global majority operate outside formal political structures. They use spirituality and faith, oral traditions, Indigenous knowledge systems, and community-centred approaches to resolve conflicts and undermine sexism and other identity-based oppressions. Decolonising WPS also involves challenging the racialised and class hierarchies that underpin international peacebuilding efforts. Many participants pointed out that the same states and governments that advocate gender-responsive peace processes abroad continue to uphold militarised, extractive and patriarchal policies that contribute to instability in conflict-affected regions at home.

Another dimension of decolonial WPS involves redistributing financial resources and decision-making power away from large international organisations and towards sub-national, feminist and community-led movements. Figure 6 illustrates that partnerships with civil society and local or regional organisations, INGOs and other non-government organisations and networks are most effective at supporting women's participation.¹¹⁴

Historically, institutions headquartered in the global north have received the majority of WPS funding, which has created dependency and inequity and limited the autonomy of global majority actors. There is a need to go beyond initiatives that promote women's representation to interrogate and transform the broader geopolitical and economic structures that shape global conflict and inequality. Reparations are a fitting response to rebalance the unjust wealth accumulated as a result of colonialism and capitalist, extractive economic practices.¹¹⁵

Figure 6

Which types of partnerships have been most effective at supporting women's roles in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the context/s you work in?



Despite this growing focus on historical legacies and unconscious approaches, many peacebuilding institutions continue to privilege the voices of Western academics, policymakers and consultants over those with lived experience of conflict, oppression and resistance. This reinforces colonial hierarchies of knowledge and leads to actions that are disconnected from local realities. Decolonial approaches seek to redefine expertise and authority to ensure that those most affected by conflict – particularly Indigenous women, displaced women, and women from historically marginalised communities – are at the forefront of shaping policies and solutions.

To ensure the WPS agenda is fit for purpose, hard conversations and change are needed to further decolonise it in the coming decade. Feminist peacebuilding efforts that challenge the root causes of militarisation, occupation and economic injustice must not be co-opted into neoliberal, bureaucratic state-led structures that depoliticise and dilute their radical potential.¹¹⁶ Many WPS programmes have become increasingly institutionalised, reducing feminist activism to technocratic, state-led policy processes.

What does doing things differently look like?

Indigenous women in Guatemala are very active in community-level climate change action and hold ecological insights that could inform international policies and practices. Yet, their leadership is often not visible and their knowledge is marginalised in male-dominated spaces.¹¹⁷

A network of women's organisations, La Alianza Política Sector de Mujeres (Women's Sector Political Alliance), has engaged in strategic advocacy to promote anti-militarism, the redistribution of care work, and transitions to sustainable, culturally rooted economies.¹¹⁸ They use Indigenous and feminist knowledge to create political education tools and train other Mayan communities in how to use them.¹¹⁹

4.2 Promising Practices

This section assesses 12 effective and promising practices that have evolved to strengthen women’s meaningful participation and the implementation of the WPS agenda. These practices were highlighted in the global survey and by research participants including in Sudan, Myanmar and Ethiopia.

Research participants highlighted that grassroots initiatives by women’s organisations, advocacy by women’s organisations and government policies (e.g. quotas) were the three most effective strategies in including women in conflict resolution and peace processes (Figure 7).¹²⁰ Figure 8 indicates that they

listed the top five priorities to advance the WPS agenda as requiring: more and better-quality funding to local and national women’s rights organisations, moving away from incremental or separate processes for women’s participation to integrated inclusion, greater accountability to implement existing policies and legal frameworks, gendered analysis embedded in conflict and political analysis, and working in solidarity with men.¹²¹

Figure 7

Which of the following strategies has been most effective at including women in conflict resolution and peace processes in the context/s you work in?




Figure 8

In the next decade, 2025–2035, what do you regard as the top five priorities to advance the WPS agenda?

Priority actions to advance the WPS agenda



All the practices reviewed here offer potential value. To help the reader understand where greater care and evidence is required, they are ranked using a traffic light system.



Gender quotas
Sub-national WPS Plans
Rapid response, pooled funds and feminist funds
Gender budgeting and markers
Gender-disaggregated data and feminist storytelling



Digital tools for inclusion
Gender mainstreaming
Strategic litigation
Men stepping up in solidarity
Working with faith actors to contextualise



Feminist Foreign Policies
Women's Mediation Networks

Those in **green** are considered effective based on current evidence. Those coded **orange** are promising, but require caution and more nuanced application. Practices in **red** have yet to build momentum but could still bear fruit with more careful, evidence-informed efforts. This list is not exhaustive, due to space constraints.

The rest of this section evaluates the implementation of these practices and their outcomes. Each practice includes an example and discusses some of the conditions required for effective implementation.

What is working well:

Quotas are widely used to increase the numeric representation of traditionally excluded groups in electoral processes and parliaments and other governance bodies. Over 130 countries have gender quotas in place to remedy male dominance of electoral processes and parliamentary roles.¹²² The global proportion of women in parliament increased from 11.3 per cent in 1995 to 27.2 per cent in 2024. Nearly a quarter (23 per cent) of cabinet members worldwide were women in 2024; the share was 19 per cent in conflict-affected countries.¹²³

Quotas have generally been effective at increasing women's representation; increasing their access to political opportunities and participation in parliaments, peace negotiations and accords; and generally normalising their visibility in decision-making.¹²⁴ A UN Women study found that 22 conflict-affected countries with legislated gender quotas have higher levels of women's parliamentary representation – averaging 25 per cent, compared to 15 per cent in countries without quotas.¹²⁵ This difference can be attributed to persistent structural, cultural, and institutional barriers that limit women's access to political networks and decision-making spaces, compound discriminatory electoral systems, and withhold financial and institutional support from women candidates.¹²⁶

The concept of critical mass in the context of women's political participation suggests that a certain threshold of representation – often cited as around 30 per cent – must be reached before women can influence policy outcomes and institutional culture.¹²⁷ Below this threshold, women are often seen as symbolic or token representatives and may lack the power or numbers to drive substantive change. Once a critical mass is achieved, however, women are more likely to form coalitions, challenge dominant norms and reshape political agendas to better reflect gendered concerns.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, quotas should be seen as a minimum threshold rather than the ultimate aim.



Box 3: Example from Nepal

After the country's Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006, persistent activism from women, Dalit and other marginalised groups helped to secure a mandatory 33 per cent quota for women in the national parliament in the 2007 Interim Constitution. Gender quotas codified in the 2015 Constitution have radically increased women's parliamentary and sub-national representation from 5 to 41 per cent, the highest level in South Asia.¹²⁹ Quotas have strengthened women's position in society, established their credibility and shifted the gender bias related to women's presence in politics.¹³⁰



What needs to change:

Despite this promising data, overall support for quotas is low; elites and others who benefit from the status quo consider them controversial and unfair.¹³¹ A range of factors causes significant resistance to legislating gender quotas to increase women's representation. For instance, men believe they will lose out, and many women want to advance on merit and resist being a 'quota lady'. Many critics of quotas overestimate women's representation. When they are correctly informed about how long it will take women to achieve anything approximating equity in formal institutions – often hundreds of years – they tend to support gender quotas.¹³²

Updated constitutions that include quotas have surged, but these changes can be easily reversed. In Tunisia, ineffective legal safeguards and the removal of gender quotas has resulted in recent backsliding of women's representation and democratic norms.¹³³ In 2018 the new Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali achieved gender parity in his cabinet: 50 per cent of the ministers were women, including the country's first female Minister of Defence and Head of State.¹³⁴ However, these women were gradually removed from their positions, citing their lack of ability or performance, while their male colleagues remained in power. This prevented women from influencing national politics¹³⁵ and led to accusations that the women were appointed to enhance Ethiopia's image and attract international praise via a practice known as 'genderwashing' – strategically adopting gender equality policies and instrumentalising women while avoiding structural change.¹³⁶

Powerholders, often elite men, are a significant barrier to sharing power. One interviewee observed, ***"There is no political will to train men or change the laws during the war."***¹³⁷ Conflicts and political settlements tend to entrench the hold on power, rather than relinquish it, which partly explains why quotas tend to get agreed for 'later'.

The conflict resolution sector needs far greater competence on gender quotas and determining effective models to propose, particularly as a way to remedy historical disadvantage.

Mediation teams should consistently embed quotas into all facilitation and mediation of peace processes. This includes socialising conflict parties early to women's presence by ensuring mixed-gender co-leadership of facilitation teams. Gender quotas need to become routine and normalised in national (Track 1) and community-level peace negotiations (Track 2 and 3 processes) to ensure that women from diverse backgrounds have formal and substantive decision-making roles, and are not just consulted or organised into separate women's groups. Independent third parties should monitor and enforce compliance.¹³⁸ Enabling measures are fundamental and should include women's caucuses, maternity and family leave, and training and mentoring for women to confidently navigate male-dominated spaces. Providing funding for women who are not given support by the negotiating entity they are associated with can also help guarantee their involvement.

Sub-national WPS Plans

What has worked:

In 2004, the UN Security Council called upon Member States to develop NAPs to advance the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the wider WPS agenda. If designed well and fully implemented, NAPs can be a strategic tool for states and a host of stakeholders to institutionalise and contextualise the WPS agenda to national and local contexts.¹³⁹ Countries with dedicated WPS policies, such as NAPs, are more likely to appoint women mediators to peace processes.¹⁴⁰

As of June 2025, 108 countries (56 per cent) have developed a WPS NAP, as have many regional institutions; some municipal and district governments have adopted sub-national and local action plans.¹⁴¹ These sub-national plans could help bridge national funding and political momentum with local stakeholders and resources, which could advance WPS implementation. This is important in contexts with sub-national conflicts that are often poorly reflected in national-level plans, especially when the 'nation' is a contested concept. Effective localised plans require collaboration with civil society and sub-national authorities and powerholders during the design process and in implementation across all portfolios and coordination mechanisms with all key actors. They also require a robust monitoring and evaluation framework including an independent process led by civil society, sustained cross-actor political leadership, and predictable and sustainable financing.¹⁴²

What needs to change:

Participants confirmed that NAPs help institutionalise WPS goals, but are rarely optimally implemented, particularly at the national level.¹⁴³ One participant explained, ***"On paper it is a good development because it signals operationalising commitments to women, peace and security. But I think [it] very rarely has teeth and if anything can just be a siloed process that's not actually multisectoral, which is ultimately the aim of NAPs."***¹⁴⁴

For example, the EU's Country Level Implementation Plans (CLIPs), which form part of the GAP, aim to enhance sub-national implementation. CLIPs are platforms that allow EU delegations, local leaders, CSOs, and partner governments to exchange tools and lessons learned to advance gender equality. CLIPs have shown promise in localising GAP III priorities and fostering coordinated approaches, but their effectiveness is contingent on adequate resources, expertise and national institutional support. Greater impact could be achieved by working with local stakeholders to further decentralise these implementation plans to the sub-national level.¹⁴⁵

NAPs can be localised by creating sub-national plans, providing consistent funding, and using culturally appropriate language and terminology. Doing so could help navigate barriers to WPS implementation in many contexts and ensure that NAPs can better respond to human security needs and account with nuance for the different kinds of security risks and political processes in various parts of a country. For example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has supported Local Action Plans in Kyrgyzstan as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet implementation is slow and has created tension between the national and local authorities.¹⁴⁶

Box 4: Example from the Philippines

The Bangsamoro Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security 2023–2028¹⁴⁷ is a comprehensive sub-national framework for advancing gender equality and sustainable peace in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The plan is aligned with national commitments and was developed through extensive consultations with government ministries, local government units, CSOs and international partners. It has 18 action points and 68 indicators focused on goals ranging from protection to long-term development.¹⁴⁸



Broader areas for revitalising NAPs are worth noting. Until 2013, they did not reference men and masculinities. The Global Study highlighted that focusing exclusively on women falsely signals that the WPS agenda only impacts (and is the responsibility of) women.¹⁴⁹ WPS policies are also rarely aligned with other relevant sectors and policies, including climate justice. For example, less than one-quarter of NAPs reference disarmament or arms control and few have substantive measures of economic security.¹⁵⁰

To ensure the WPS agenda is truly transformative, implementation must move beyond traditional silos and be integrated across sectors – including economic security, disarmament, climate resilience and health – to reflect the full spectrum of human security. Sub-national plans should be scaled up to incorporate localised security risks and cultural realities to enable more responsive and inclusive implementation. This requires institutionalising meaningful civil society participation to ensure that women-led and feminist organisations shape WPS policies at every stage, grounding them in lived experience and strengthening accountability.



Rapid Response, Pooled Funds and Feminist Funds

What has worked:

In response to the limited funding provided to women and girls and the WPS agenda more broadly, the number of rapid response and pooled funds has increased over the past decade.¹⁵¹ This support has come in the form of financial grants and resources for rapid, emergency response and long-term flexible funding that can offer a critical, collective mechanism to facilitate women's timely participation in peace processes.¹⁵² For instance in Myanmar, flexible funding for young children's travel and accommodation enabled their mothers to attend workshops. When a Kachin lawyer, a primary carer, needed her son to travel with her, funders agreed to cover these costs so she could participate in peace consultations.¹⁵³

The Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund, a global pooled funding mechanism, was designed to provide faster financing for strategic, short-term, and urgent services and efforts led by women peacebuilders and women's CSOs. Since 2016, it has supported over 1,300 local women's CSOs in 44 crisis-affected contexts, and in 2023 it raised over USD 45 million. The Fund is generally viewed positively, but it is also perceived as being less flexible than feminist funding models – such as community-managed funds and South–South financing networks – and has been criticised for being overly bureaucratic.¹⁵⁴ In response, for example, the French and Dutch governments are increasingly providing direct support to women's rights organisations and feminist movements.¹⁵⁵

What needs to change:

Funding mechanisms designed to support women's peacebuilding efforts have often proven to be a double-edged sword. Political caution and organisational inertia often hinder funding, and recipients consider such mechanisms to be highly bureaucratic and involve a significant reporting burden.¹⁵⁶ Donors provide crucial resources, but donor practices and NGO behaviours can contribute to or exacerbate the proliferation and dependency of NGOs, which risks commodifying participation and

undermining the scalability and sustainability of genuinely community-driven efforts.¹⁵⁷ One interviewee observed that, ***“More than 800 NGOs have closed down in Uganda due to the lack of external funding...Everything these days is monetised...which makes sustainability difficult”***.¹⁵⁸ This reliance on external funding highlights the need for new financial models that can withstand shifting donor priorities and bureaucratic inflexibility.

The majority of WPS funding is provided within short-term rigid frameworks with one-sided accountability; most partnership costs are unclear yet demand one-way due diligence. Local and women's rights organisations operate on shoestring budgets, struggle to pay for basic costs and take immense risks to reach those in need. This top-down approach places compliance burdens on local partners, stifling innovation and marginalising their voices in decision-making.¹⁵⁹ It prevents locally led organisations from growing, sustaining impact or achieving financial independence.

Even when funding is available, patriarchal structures continue to obstruct access for women, limiting their ability to fully utilise the available resources and manage their own risks safely. An interviewee observed, ***“When women actually have access to flexible funding, that makes a huge difference.”***¹⁶⁰ In response, feminist funding models have become more widespread. Feminist organisations, mindful of the shrinking donor budgets, have urged: ***“if you cannot give more, give core”***. Core funding maximises the flexible use of resources; it allows groups to respond rapidly to emergencies, provides backstopping capacity, and helps ensure well-being and safety.¹⁶¹ Flexible, responsive feminist funding models can empower women, yet they are not widely implemented due to bureaucratic constraints and patriarchal resistance from large multilateral, bilateral and private donors.

Traditional definitions of expertise have been too narrow. The current defunding of the aid sector by many traditional donors provides an opportunity to collaborate and to redistribute power and resources directly to local experts. To transform resourcing for women-led peacebuilding, donors must institutionalise flexible, core, and long-term funding models that prioritise institutional resilience and sustainability over short-term project cycles. This includes simplifying the application and reporting processes, embedding shared risk frameworks that dismantle colonial hierarchies, and ensuring that compliance burdens do not disproportionately fall on local women's organisations.

Locally owned, decolonial feminist funding models should be scaled to reduce external dependency and prioritise local priorities. Crucially, access to funding must be restructured to challenge patriarchal gatekeeping and ensure that marginalised women – including Indigenous women, women with disabilities and rural leaders – can directly shape, access and manage the resources needed to drive inclusive peace.

Box 5: Example from Indonesia

In 2023, the Urgent Action Fund for Women's Human Rights in Asia and the Pacific provided 41 grants worth a total of USD 298,387 to expand safety and care structures for women, trans, and non-binary human rights defenders and to respond to unexpected needs.¹⁶² This work includes legal and community support, sustainable livelihoods, physical and mental safety, and security. For example, the Fund offered a grant to Indigenous women activists in Indonesia who were facing legal charges due to their resistance to mining. Its team helped to draft the activists' application and removed reporting requirements – providing flexibility to achieve language justice and encourage Indigenous resistance.





Gender Budgeting and Markers

What has worked:

There is a striking disparity between the widespread development of WPS policies and the limited funding allocations, particularly to women's rights and women-led CSOs, to achieve them.¹⁶³ Gender budgeting is often seen as a technical fix to counter this barrier. It applies gender mainstreaming to budgetary processes to ensure a fairer distribution of resources. When done well, it illustrates will and commitment and reserves space for actions to advance gender equity and equality. It also ensures that actions support gender equality, since budgets draw attention to funded areas. Careful gender budgeting involves strategically assessing how various spending and revenue decisions affect women, men and non-binary people and actively triggers a review of funding decisions.¹⁶⁴

For example, underfunding of safe public transportation in Brazil was linked to the prevalence of GBV and reduced mobility for women. The government responded with targeted funding for gender budgeting, including in the transport infrastructure.¹⁶⁵ When this information is available, budget holders can target available resources to address gender inequalities.


Gender markers are an accountability tool to evaluate, strengthen and adapt practices.¹⁶⁷ For example, when donors request a gender marker score using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) approach from grant recipients, this can stimulate organisations to dig deeper and do more, especially when donors reject '0' scores and scrutinise '1' scores.

Markers continue to evolve. For example, the UK Government found that the OECD-DAC markers did not provide the organisational data and learning required to deepen WPS implementation. In 2022, it developed a new five-point Gender Equality and Social Inclusion marker to better assess and track nuanced progress on gender equality.¹⁶⁸ This scale has helped measure incremental change, but many decision-makers focus on only one form of exclusion (e.g. disability) instead of multiple forms of exclusion at the same time (e.g. gender, disability and ethnicity); a five-point schema can also be confusing in a sea of three- and four-point markers.



Box 6: Example from Thailand

Thailand is widely recognised for amending its constitution in 2017 to include gender-responsive budgeting and making comprehensive legislative and resourcing changes to integrate it across all levels of government decision-making. Since 2022, efforts have been directed at the private sector as well. These involve coordinating work in this area and providing training to integrate gender equality into budgeting processes, programmes and activities in an attempt to realise policy and operational changes. This shift was driven by gender rights advocates working on the Constitution Drafting Committee, collaborating with gender focal points in key ministries.¹⁶⁶



What needs to change:

Gender budgeting is widely recognised as a helpful tool, particularly by multilateral and bilateral institutions. Yet data from 105 countries indicates that only 26 per cent have comprehensive systems to track gender equality allocations in the budget.¹⁶⁹

Gender budgeting is poorly applied in the peace and security industry due to both a lack of requests and knowledge from donors and flawed leadership and practice within organisations.

For example, in one context, peace support actors provided USD 6 million to a multi-donor fund to sustain the participation of various male-dominated armed groups in peace talks. The budget was annotated to include actions to advance gender equality and women's participation. Despite repeated requests to review spending and to identify areas for improvement, these actions were not implemented and the fund continued to contravene its own WPS policies.¹⁷⁰

Gender marker systems must be urgently revised and expanded to strengthen accountability for gender equality in peacebuilding and development. Existing frameworks should be updated to adopt intersectional gender markers that assess how interventions impact women across lines of race, class, disability and sexual orientation. Institutions must also adopt a zero-tolerance approach to gender-unaware programming by refusing to fund initiatives that fail to meet minimum standards of gender responsiveness. Crucially, independent oversight mechanisms, led by feminist economists and gender experts from the global majority, should be established to review gender budgeting processes, monitor compliance, and ensure that financial allocations translate into transformative outcomes for women and marginalised communities.





Gender-Disaggregated Data and Feminist Storytelling

What is working:

Gender-disaggregated data is critical to the implementation of the WPS agenda because it exposes the different ways in which conflict and peace processes affect diverse individuals. It can be used to pinpoint social and economic inequalities and power dynamics, including participation patterns such as unpaid care work by gender, access to leadership, or experiences of GBV depending on gender identity. Without this data, policies and programmes will be unable to make evidence-based decisions, track progress or hold institutions accountable.

UNSCR 1889 (2009) called for the collection of gender-disaggregated data to improve monitoring of women's participation in peace processes. Since then, many states and international, national and local organisations have actively gathered and shared such data to improve effective WPS decision-making.¹⁷¹ However, funding for these efforts still privileges INGOs and UN entities over NGOs and CSOs, which are arguably much better placed to "count" women in peace processes – especially those who are less visible in important and influential roles as advisers, topic experts and facilitators.

Traditional research papers, communications and data often overlook complexity in local contexts and Indigenous knowledge systems. Feminist storytelling is a more effective method for conveying experiences and explaining complex data. It involves sharing the stories of marginalised people, particularly women, and presenting them as equally important as mainstream narratives.¹⁷² This approach creates a cognitive dissonance that breaks down invisible barriers and highlights commonalities between individuals and thematic issues. As one participant explained, ***"I have noticed that all these movements are working in parallel. They are not connecting with each other...[In contrast] my work is in a lot of different spaces – in climate justice spaces, in sexual and reproductive health spaces and also in economics from a very feminist lens".***¹⁷³

Feminist storytelling bridges invisible spaces to foster empathy and create connections. These stories can disrupt disconnections and help people understand how their experiences are intertwined with those of others. Ultimately, feminist storytelling can lead to profound changes by shifting perspectives and fostering a deeper understanding of shared humanity.¹⁷⁴

What needs to change:

Gender-disaggregated data is often collected due to pressure from civil society or because donors require it. However, many national and local institutions lack the capacity, political will or standardised tools to analyse and use it effectively.

Relying solely on quantitative data to demonstrate the importance of the WPS agenda may obscure the lived experiences of women that need to be understood in order to generate meaningful progress. By valuing feminist storytelling more widely, the WPS agenda can amplify the voices of those directly affected by conflict and insecurity, revealing localised challenges and innovative practices, which may lead to more effective and contextually relevant policies and interventions.

What is working:

Technology has helped advance women's rights around the world in important ways. It has enabled innovative solutions for peacebuilding and conflict resolution and provided more tools for conflict prevention and response. However, it is fundamentally transforming how GBV is experienced by intensifying the scale and forms.

Digital inclusion can strengthen the legitimacy of peace processes and their outcomes, empower marginalised and vulnerable groups, transform community relationships, and reduce the threats or risks to a peace process.¹⁷⁵ Digital tools can help bridge the gap for women in peacebuilding, particularly in restricted environments. They offer a platform for remote engagement, which allows women to participate despite geographical and political constraints. For example, activists in Myanmar use online initiatives to counter misinformation and encourage defection. The YouTube channels Blooming Padauk and Breaking Brainwash have over 350,000 subscribers and share life-after-military stories, offering practical advice and support for defectors.¹⁷⁶

What needs to change:

Emerging forms of global instability and conflict use AI and cyber and information warfare technologies, nanotechnology, biotechnology and robotics. These technologies blur the traditional distinctions between armed actors and civilians as well as between physical, structural and digital security. Yet cybersecurity concerns are rarely reflected in NAPs or other women's rights and gender equality policies.¹⁷⁷

Digital inclusion has transformative potential, but challenges such as digital literacy and security risks persist. This is especially important given the sophistication of surveillance technologies and the expanded the criminalisation of virtual private networks in conflict-affected contexts such as Myanmar.¹⁷⁸ For example, worldwide, roughly 265 million fewer women than men have a smartphone and can access mobile internet services. Women are under-represented in the digital revolution across all countries, despite the potential to enhance gender equality through access to technology.¹⁷⁹ Change will require multilateral organisations, government authorities and policymakers, tech companies, educational institutions and advocacy organisations to improve equitable online access and promote policies that protect women from TFGBV, harassment and abuse.¹⁸⁰

Gendered disinformation is ***"a form of identity-based disinformation that...undermines the digital and political rights, as well as the safety and security, of its targets"***.¹⁸¹ It is "used to justify human rights abuses and entrench repression of women and minority groups".¹⁸² This practice threatens to reverse global progress towards gender equality. It creates spaces for hate, discrimination, and harassment in which women and people belonging to marginalised groups (e.g. LGBTQIA+, Black, minority faith) are disproportionately targeted. Women's rights are depicted as threats to order and national identity and are used to foster social divisions, often as part of a wider assault on human rights. This undermines the effectiveness, equity, and representativeness of public institutions and reduces the space for diversity in public life.

To safeguard women and non-binary individuals in political, peacebuilding, environmental and humanitarian spaces, states and institutions must implement a zero-tolerance policy and legal frameworks that offer robust, enforceable protection against violence, intimidation and threats. These must be complemented by inclusive early warning and monitoring systems, especially in digital environments and high-risk sectors such as extractive industries, developed in collaboration with technology firms and resource companies to prevent harm and ensure rapid response to emerging risks.

An example of actions that organisations can put in place is the sectors-wide collaboration of the Misconduct Disclosure Scheme, a global initiative to strengthen safeguarding by preventing perpetrators of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment from moving between organisations undetected by standardising reference checks and accountability practices. Between 2019 and 2023, the scheme conducted over 137,000 checks, resulting in 385 recruitment rejections.¹⁸³

Box 7: Example from Sudan

Building on the efforts of smaller innovative organisations, in mid-2023 the CMI – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation coordinated a series of digital peacebuilding dialogues in Sudan using AI.¹⁸⁴ Active women's groups and networks, resistance committees, and young people in and outside Sudan were identified and approached to participate. The online dialogues were conducted in real time with Arabic language facilitation and included a week-long session that surveyed views on specific topics. This work requires trust in the digital tool and the convening organisation, access to online networks and planning to ensure diverse participation.



What has worked:

Gender mainstreaming was first proposed in 1985, and in 1995 the Beijing Declaration emphasised its importance. In response, the UN and many other development, humanitarian and conflict resolution organisations have established gender focal points and advisers to ensure that gender considerations are incorporated into their internal operations, programmes and policies. The focal points are non-specialist staff members tasked with advocating for gender equality, coordinating efforts on gender-responsive policies, and monitoring and reporting on the implementation of gender equality initiatives. They are often the first point of contact for victims and survivors of sexual harassment and are frontline stakeholders in fostering organisational culture change.¹⁸⁵

Gender advisers are meant to play a key role in bringing evidence and practice innovation into the work of organisations. In addition, they help raise awareness and ensure that policies and practices take gender and inclusion issues into account; they also provide advice, training and advocacy.¹⁸⁶ In Colombia, gender advisers have supported local advocates to ensure gender is integrated into peace, ceasefire and humanitarian access agreements as well as conflict mediation strategies. Their involvement has generated more inclusive and gender-responsive peace processes.¹⁸⁷

What needs to change:

Gender mainstreaming efforts have been mixed: sub-par advisers and reluctant focal points have weakened them.¹⁸⁸ Such efforts also tend to focus on altering internal language in documents and processes rather than emphasising measurable results.¹⁸⁹ Focal point roles are often allocated to younger, less experienced women in work units overburdened by multiple responsibilities; the roles are informal and unpaid, and they have access to limited funding and influence over organisational decision-makers.

In addition, the terms of reference are unclear and accountability frameworks tend to be weak.¹⁹⁰

Similarly, advisers have often assumed such roles simply because they are women; they may lack a clear grasp of core concepts and knowledge of different forms of evidence.

Building capacity by providing training has been highly uneven; it depends on the depth and quality of training, the level of organisational buy-in and the commitment to gender inclusion after the training. Training can strengthen employees' understanding of gender dynamics, provide the necessary skills to integrate gender perspectives into their work and create institutional momentum for change. However, without a comprehensive approach that includes strong leadership, adequate resources, accountability frameworks and long-term institutional policies, training is rarely sustainable.¹⁹¹ Mentoring and accompaniment on the job can be more effective for gender mainstreaming than one-off training sessions because it fosters continuous personalised learning and reflection that helps individuals apply gender equality to their work.¹⁹²

To mainstream gender effectively across peace and security institutions, astute and capable gender advisers who have strategic influence should be included in senior management processes with dedicated budgets. Strong accountability frameworks, such as performance indicators and reporting systems, should be implemented to track advisers' impact to weed out underperformers who become gatekeepers and constitute yet another barrier to women's meaningful participation. Regional knowledge-sharing networks can help advisers and focal points exchange good practices and navigate institutional barriers. Long-term mentorship models should replace one-off training to ensure ongoing, context-specific learning, and gender equality competencies must be embedded across job descriptions, evaluations and leadership pipelines to institutionalise transformative change.

What has worked:

Strategic litigation has not yet been widely used to promote the WPS agenda. Nevertheless, it is a promising practice that climate, environmental, land rights and Indigenous activists have widely used in other sectors to hold violators to account. This approach is considered 'strategic' because it aims to use the legal system to influence policy and prevent violations of rights and agreed international legal frameworks. Cases are designed to reinforce state or institutional human rights obligations and strengthen their responsibility to protect these rights. Strategic litigation has changed legislation and public policy, helped develop jurisprudence on reparations, and amended policies and internal procedures on survivor-centred protection (such as interim measures, victim support and assistance protocols, and investigation protocols for specific crimes).¹⁹³

Women's rights organisations and advocates have employed strategic litigation to prosecute GBV and to hold perpetrators accountable. The 2016 Sepur Sarco court case in Guatemala addressed sexual violence against Indigenous women during the country's civil war by members of the Guatemalan army. It resulted in convictions and reparations, including financial compensation.¹⁹⁴ In 2017, the Latin American Network for Gender-based Strategic Litigation (Red Latinoamericana de Litigio Estratégico en Género) was formed to promote and strengthen accountability for gender-based crimes in the region, and to provide a forum for advocates to exchange good practices for litigation. Climate justice and environmental groups have also successfully used strategic litigation. For instance, Indigenous and First Nations peoples have pursued this approach to highlight the dangers of climate change and environmental destruction to Indigenous women.

What needs to change:

Despite its demonstrated potential, strategic litigation remains underutilised in the WPS space and is often disconnected from broader peacebuilding and accountability processes. It can be slow moving and costly, but it can unlock transformative potential. It could be proactively integrated into WPS frameworks not merely as a legal remedy, but as a tool for systemic change. This would require strengthening the legal capacity of women-led organisations, building alliances with human rights defenders, and embedding litigation within broader advocacy strategies that centre women's agency and intersectional justice. Donors and international organisations must also ensure that litigation is not extractive but locally driven, adequately resourced and linked to reparative outcomes. Without structural investment in feminist legal strategies and safeguards to prevent backlash, strategic litigation will remain a missed opportunity in the pursuit of gender-just peace.¹⁹⁵

Strategic litigation must be integrated into WPS frameworks to confront structural inequalities and advance gender justice. Legal action can dismantle discriminatory laws, address GBV and secure reparations for survivors, drawing on precedents like the Sepur Zarco case in Guatemala. Cross-sectoral alliances with women's rights, environmental and Indigenous groups can strengthen litigation that exposes the gendered harms of conflict and ecological degradation, as seen in the Sámi women's case in Norway.

Box 8: Example from the Sámi Peoples

Reindeer herding is a male-dominated activity among the Indigenous Sámi, but the women are primarily responsible for managing their communities' natural resources. Any destruction of land and resources profoundly impacts their gender roles. In March 2024, Sámi women reached a legal agreement with the Norwegian Government over its expansion of wind farms. They highlighted the government's lack of climate action and how environmental degradation affected their customary lifestyle and cultural practices. The litigation sought to ensure that climate justice and gender equality were prioritised.¹⁹⁶



Men Stepping Up in Solidarity

“ Make sure the policies on women peace and security do not reinforce the...gender equals women narrative that is creating a huge burden on the women’s movement and women in general to... dismantle the system...whereas it is everyone’s issue and men who keep on reinforcing the patriarchal system [need] to be taking more responsibility to dismantle this system.”¹⁹⁷

What is working:

Building solidarity with men and boys to transform gendered power structures and advance inclusive peace is an increasingly recognised WPS practice. Sustained progress requires addressing how men perpetuate or dismantle patriarchal values, using strategies grounded in evidence and critical reflection on men’s roles in conflict, power and governance. Effective engagement involves moving beyond symbolic inclusion, using intentional approaches that disrupt harmful masculinities, ensure accountability, and promote non-violent, gender-transformative security. The most promising models focus on structural change and challenge how masculinity is weaponised in security, governance and economic systems.¹⁹⁸

A key challenge is the perception of gender equality as solely a “women’s issue”, prompting resistance from male-dominated peace and security institutions. An important shift in men’s engagement is the move from passive allyship to active accountability and solidarity.¹⁹⁹ Early efforts focused on male leaders as “champions” of women’s rights, which elevated WPS visibility but led to superficial inclusion that valued social media clicks and presence over genuine action. Successful initiatives by organisations such as MenEngage Alliance²⁰⁰ and ABAAD – Resource Center for Gender Equality²⁰¹ work within faith and cultural contexts, avoiding one-size-fits-all frameworks. Effective engagement is grounded in localised, context-driven approaches, which recognise that masculinity is often tied to economic survival, social status and dominance.²⁰²

What needs to change:

The majority (54.83 per cent) of research participants said men in leadership positions do not typically support women’s inclusion in conflict resolution and peace processes in the contexts they work in.²⁰³ Men must be engaged alongside structural reforms that dismantle patriarchal institutions. If systemic power structures are not addressed, engagement will remain limited to individual behaviour change – which is beneficial, but more is needed.

Effective initiatives link men’s engagement to political and economic reforms that redistribute power; engagement then involves shifting resources, authority and decision-making. A trauma-informed approach is also essential, as many men in conflict contexts experience trauma, which reinforces rigid masculinities that sustain violence.²⁰⁴ Some WPS programmes integrate mental health and psychosocial support and training on non-violent masculinities to offer alternatives to militarised identities; this approach needs to be used more widely.

A masculinities lens in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is also critical.²⁰⁵ Traditional DDR programmes often reinforce violent masculine norms by prioritising male combatants and ignoring gender power structures. Gender-responsive DDR emphasises non-violent masculinities through mental health and psychosocial support, alternative livelihoods and education challenging unequal gender hierarchies. It also addresses the reintegration needs of women ex-combatants and gender-diverse individuals.²⁰⁶

Transformative implementation of the WPS agenda requires moving beyond symbolic inclusion towards holding men in leadership roles accountable for dismantling patriarchal systems within all the institutions they live and work in. This includes developing measurable accountability mechanisms that ensure rhetoric aligns with action.

Security must be redefined through a gender lens, shifting from militarised approaches to community-rooted, human-centric peacebuilding strategies. Expanding mental health and psychosocial support for men and boys in post-war contexts is also essential to address trauma, forced conscription and socialisation into violent masculinities, thereby fostering more inclusive and sustainable peace.



Box 9: Example from Pakistan

The local Pakistani NGO Rozan has worked with the police since 1999 to better respond to women, children, faith minorities and transgender survivors of GBV. It has advocated for gender-responsive laws and policy reform and created a country-wide training partnership with the National Police Academy. The organisation has trained over 4,000 police officers in social awareness and anger management and examined societal expectations about men's and women's behaviour.²⁰⁷ Rozan has experienced resistance, including claims that the training would emasculate male police officers.²⁰⁸





Working with Faith Actors to Contextualise WPS

“ If we don’t engage [faith institutions], we miss one of the biggest influencers of social norms...If we shift harmful norms that are reinforced by faith understandings of women’s roles, we create an enabling environment where women feel affirmed in their right to lead, and communities open up spaces for women in decision-making.”²⁰⁹

What has worked:

A promising and often undervalued practice is the strategic engagement of faith actors to contextualise gender equality and peace promotion within faith and cultural traditions.²¹⁰ Faith leaders and institutions often serve as influencers, guides and gatekeepers of social norms, community cohesion and moral guidance. Their support is therefore critical to encourage acceptance and implementation of WPS initiatives. Collaborating with these actors represents a powerful pathway for promoting gender equality and advancing WPS objectives in ways that can resonate more deeply. Faith institutions are critical sites for disseminating information and shaping public opinion. By partnering with faith actors, WPS initiatives can extend their reach beyond urban centres into remote or marginalised areas that formal or national peacebuilding efforts may not directly engage.²¹¹

Contextualising gender equality within faith narratives can help transcend patriarchal interpretations of religious doctrines that have historically justified gender inequality. In many traditions, sacred texts and teachings are open to interpretation, while others provide clear opportunities to anchor gender equality and active peace promotion in respected faith doctrine. Rather than imposing external gender norms, framing gender equality as a moral and ethical imperative rooted in faith teachings can reduce resistance and foster community buy-in. This approach creates a safe space for faith leaders to discuss sensitive gender issues and explore gender justice without feeling that their faith is being attacked or undermined.²¹²

What needs to change:

Faith leaders and faith institutions have historically perpetuated patriarchal norms and resisted gender equality. Therefore, collaboration must be approached with nuance, cultural sensitivity and a readiness to navigate complex power dynamics within faith communities. Some faith leaders may support certain aspects of WPS, such as ending GBV, while opposing others, like women’s political leadership or LGBTQIA+ rights. Engagement requires careful negotiation and ongoing dialogue so that partnerships do not inadvertently reinforce other forms of exclusion or discrimination.

Faith-based gender justice frameworks should be developed and institutionalised by partnering with theologians to craft culturally grounded interpretations of religious texts that affirm women’s leadership, non-violence and equality. Translating WPS principles into faith narratives empowers religious leaders to embed these messages into sermons and community teachings, fostering alignment between spiritual values and gender-inclusive peacebuilding. This approach builds grassroots legitimacy, challenges patriarchal norms from within and creates a powerful entry point for WPS implementation in deeply religious contexts.

Box 10: Example from the Democratic Republic of Congo

The INGO Tearfund has been working in the DRC with faith leaders and faith communities on shifting attitudes to GBV. Faith-based education is used to reinterpret scriptures and promote positive masculinities and gender equality involving men and boys. Tearfund does not directly challenge gender roles; it questions the values assigned to these roles and how they can be renegotiated. This work resulted in women reporting a reduction of 69 per cent to 29 per cent in intimate partner violence in just two years.²¹³





Feminist Foreign Policy (FFPs)

What is working well:

FFPs were introduced as a progressive approach to embedding gender equality into diplomatic and peacebuilding efforts. Sweden adopted the world's first FFP in 2014, and 16 other countries have since done so. While there is no agreed standard of what constitutes an FFP, most commit the country to mainstream a gender perspective in all foreign policy actions and agencies and to resource gender equality through their aid and development initiatives. Advocates say FFPs have the capacity to provide greater accountability for states to eliminate structural violence and achieve gender equality.

What needs to change:

FFP implementation often falls short due to bureaucratic and structural constraints. FFPs are frequently reduced to symbolic gestures that are politically contingent and performative, rather than vehicles for driving substantive change. Political caution and incrementalism hinder the full realisation of feminist ambitions. Policymakers often opt for cautious, step-by-step reforms rather than bold, transformative actions. Key states, including Sweden and Germany, have demonstrated recent backsliding on FFP commitments.²¹⁴ This deprioritisation of FFP indicates it is largely normative unless it is integrated into key institutions and foreign policy operations as well as funding and monitoring mechanisms.

A participant elaborated on the siloing and narrow framing of FFP: ***"Feminist foreign policy is literally just done through the foreign ministry. It doesn't touch defence, trade, science and technology or agriculture. The framing of foreign policy is, let's not stop the wars, but let's protect the women in the wars."***²¹⁵ The failure to absorb feminist values in their entirety means that FFPs sometimes reinforce the very power structures that undermine feminist peace and security. A participant reflected on this paradox: ***"Foreign policy cannot be feminist... it reinscribes the very same hierarchies that feminism is supposed to dismantle"***.²¹⁶



Box 11: Example from Mexico

Mexico was the first global majority country to develop an FFP in 2020, which committed it to non-intervention, peaceful solutions to conflict and international cooperation. It is a global leader in promoting gender equality and has strong legislation to protect sexual and reproductive health and rights as well as gender parity across all levels of government.²¹⁷ However, militarisation has increased, and funding for gender equality and GBV has decreased. Mexico's FFP does not have local accountability, as it was not informed by consultations with civil society actors and it has no domestic accountability mechanisms.²¹⁸

Critics highlight fundamental contradictions within FFPs. Many countries that have adopted them continue to support and benefit from militarism and arms trading, harmful economic or trade policies including extractive industries, the exclusion of Indigenous peoples, and the securitisation of migration and asylum policies.²¹⁹ One participant explained the tension, ***"I think feminist foreign policy is important as a concept, but when it doesn't have teeth, when it's not backed by strong commitments and financing. When there's double standards. It just really weakens the veracity of calling it feminist foreign policy."***²²⁰ For FFP to have policy coherence, it is critical to end contradictory practices, such as arms sales and extractive industry support, which create policy fatigue and scepticism, undermine feminist goals and perpetuate conflict.

While FFPs have the potential to further embed implementation of the WPS agenda, these double standards – exacerbated by the narrow framing of 'feminism', siloed approaches to implementation and dependence on consistent political will – cannot be ignored. FFP accountability requires coherence with a country's domestic policy agenda as well as engagement with the insights and priorities of feminist movements and global majority women's organisations to enact systemic change.²²¹



Women's Mediation Networks (WMN)

What has worked:

Since 2015, formal state- and civil society-led WMNs have proliferated. Every region now has a WMN in place that seeks to create an active pool of women able to serve as UN and state envoys and peace mediators. It is no longer an acceptable excuse that there are no suitable women.²²² However, NGOs are more likely than states and international organisations to appoint women mediators – despite the public commitments these national and multilateral organisations have made and the significant funding and support they provide to WMNs.²²³

If developed carefully, these networks can be intergenerational and create space for exchange and learning. Network members confirm that they have helped build solidarity, share knowledge, and engage with women leaders across sectors and conflicts with whom they would not normally have connected.²²⁴



Box 12: Example from FemWise Africa

FemWise-Africa is strategically embedded in the African Union (AU) governance architecture. As a result of their visibility, some FemWise Africa members have been part of AU Track 1 mediation delegations. In 2018, members resolved a conflict along the Tanzania–Malawi border. They have supported the AU Special Envoys Mission to Ethiopia in 2020, and were part of AU-led Election Observation missions to the DRC, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, South Africa and Malawi. The first Track 1 FemWise-Africa delegation was deployed to foster dialogue between political parties during the 2020 elections in Côte d'Ivoire.²²⁵

What needs to change:

The impact of these networks has yet to be determined. The available data indicates that WMNs have not led to significantly more women being appointed to senior mediation roles, especially by states and INGOs that continue to prioritise men in these roles.²²⁶ In addition, institutional inflexibility remains a major barrier to WMNs' effective operation; separate governance structures, training and advocacy efforts generate duplication and competition for the same limited funding and roles, and prevent the pooling of expertise and resources.

There is also potential for duplication or overlap in terms of geographical focus, scope, mandate and membership that could give rise to further competition. One interviewee described this tension: ***"The idea of women mediator networks came from South Africa as a consequence of apartheid...But now when you hear 'women mediator networks,' it's usually attached to the Nordic countries. That lineage has been erased"***.²²⁷ Coordination, through an expanded Global Network for Women Mediators Networks (in place since 2019), and increased pressure on UN entities, INGOs and states to deploy women mediators from the networks could better align the investments (finances, time, energy, commitment) in WMNs and peace promotion roles.

The dominance of well-funded global north actors has shaped WMNs to fit narrow mediation models – sidelining Indigenous or context-specific conflict resolution practices. The lack of decolonisation and feminist solidarity is glaring. To strengthen their impact, WMNs in the North should redistribute power and resources to global majority networks to demonstrate that they actively value diverse approaches to conflict resolution. Engaging with economic and environmental justice organisations, development agencies and community-based feminist movements can help decolonise the sector. Such partnerships can amplify diverse women's voices and help integrate Indigenous and feminist visions into broader political, economic and social reforms.

5. Conclusion

The goal of WPS is not to make war safer for women but to transform the root causes of violence, insecurity and inequality for everyone. Barriers to women's meaningful participation in peace and security are not incidental or an oversight: they are systemic. From the persistence of patriarchal norms and exclusionary political cultures to the unequal distribution of unpaid care work, to underinvestment in women-led peacebuilding and the need to remedy historical disadvantage, these obstacles are embedded in the very institutions tasked with fostering peace. Despite decades of incremental normative and behavioural progress, women's participation too often remains tokenistic, conditional or sidelined.

Yet this research also highlights the strategies that women's rights organisations and peacebuilders are pursuing to transform exclusion into engagement. From community organising and legal advocacy to intersectional coalition-building and feminist policymaking, women are not only contributing to peace; they are reshaping its foundations – the norms and values used to assess what peace means. These approaches must be supported through coherent, well-funded, and accountable systems that connect local efforts to national and international policy frameworks.

Addressing the barriers outlined in this report requires more than incremental reform: structural change is needed. Recognising women as agents of change (and men and LGBTQIA+ people as agents of solidarity), resourcing their leadership and reforming the systems that exclude them must become standard practice. Legal frameworks must be updated, inclusive processes institutionalised, and financing made accessible and long term. Enabling environments – physical, digital, political – must also be built and safeguarded so that participation is not only possible, but meaningful.

The report's findings have broader implications for policymakers, practitioners and donors committed to realising the WPS agenda. As conflict dynamics evolve, the urgency to move beyond rhetoric to action grows. Advancing women's participation is not just a matter of justice: it is a strategic imperative for sustainable peace.

Annex A: Key informants

The authors conducted 16 interviews with leading WPS practitioners (13 women, 3 men), primarily from global majority contexts.

We extend our deepest thanks to all the research participants, including those who conducted and participated in the Myanmar, Sudan and Ethiopia research, who generously shared their time, deep insights and lived experiences of working towards gender justice, peace and security. Each contribution has been invaluable and has shaped the findings and honed our practical recommendations.

We recognise the immense courage and commitment required to speak out and work in contexts where those working for WPS and gender equality face violence, family, political and resourcing pressures and personal risk.

While some participants chose to be publicly named, others preferred to remain anonymous – a decision we fully respect and which reflects the often-challenging contexts in which this work takes place.

In alphabetical order, participants who chose to be named included:

- Caitlin Williscroft
- Çerağ Esra Çuhadar, Ph.D. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Bilkent University
- Clare Castillejo, Senior Research Associate, ODI Global
- Dean Peacock, Honorary Senior Lecturer, University of Cape Town, Visiting Fellow, Geneva Graduate Institute
- Elizabeth Lwanga King, former United Nations Resident Coordinator; Member, African Women Mediators Network (FemWise-Africa); and an Eminent Woman, Women's Situation Room for African Elections
- Kavita N Ramdas, Founder and Principal, KNR Sisters, Senior Strategic Advisor, International Planned Parenthood Federation
- Laura Gisselly Beltrán Estepa
- Ixman belbase, Global Co-Director, MenEngage Global Alliance
- Robinah Lorna Rubimbwa, Executive Director, Coalition for Action on 1325, Chairperson, UN Women's Civil Society Advisory Group for Eastern and Southern Africa
- Sibongile Ndashe, Executive Director, Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA)
- Toni Hastrup, Professor and Chair in Global Politics, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester
- Vandita Morarka, Founder and CEO, One Future Collective
- Vidushi Yadav, Studio We Are Stories

Annex B: Research methodology and limitations

This global review evaluates the underlying drivers preventing women's meaningful participation in conflict prevention and peace processes. The research draws on Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), three in-country case studies (Ethiopia, Sudan and Myanmar), an online global survey and a comprehensive literature review. It systematically reviews the practical actions taken by stakeholders in multiple contexts to mitigate or overcome these barriers to participation and identifies patterns that can inform global and local policymaking, funding and programming.

The review takes a feminist, intersectional approach to exploring the diverse experiences of women, men and non-binary people in conflict prevention and peace processes. It examines how gender intersects with different social identities and other societal factors to affect participation. It also incorporates a decolonial approach to highlight often marginalised or under-represented knowledge and experiences such as those of Indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities and young women.

However, the study's reliance on KIIs and literature reviews introduces several methodological limitations:

- Potential for bias: The selection of key informants may introduce biases, particularly if the sample does not adequately represent diverse and marginalised stakeholder perspectives.
- Challenges in ensuring comprehensive intersectional analysis: While the study aims to apply an intersectional lens, it is difficult to meaningfully capture intersecting identities (such as race, ethnicity, age and disability). This may result in an incomplete understanding of the diverse factors influencing women's participation in peace processes.
- Data reliability issues: Collecting reliable and valid data in conflict-affected areas – such as Sudan, Myanmar and Ethiopia – poses significant challenges due to security risks, limited access and potential biases from participants who may not feel safe to speak openly.
- Dependence on secondary data sources: Such sources, particularly regarding under-researched regions or marginalised groups, may not fully capture local contexts or the experiences of women's organisations and communities.

The volatile political and security environments in the focus countries also present several challenges:

- Instability and access restrictions: Political resistance, security threats and changes in government could impede data collection or lead to incomplete datasets. Instability may also affect key informants' willingness to participate, potentially skewing the findings.
- Safety concerns for participants and researchers: The potential for harm, harassment or retaliation may limit the scope and depth of data collection and affect the validity of the study's findings.
- Challenges in measuring impact: Measuring the impact of WPS interventions and defining "meaningful participation" is inherently complex and context dependent. The study's design may face difficulties in establishing uniform indicators of success across different contexts, which could affect the comparability and interpretation of the findings.
- Limited stakeholder engagement: The study may struggle to fully engage diverse stakeholders, particularly marginalised groups (such as rural women, ethnic and faith minorities, and women with disabilities), due to limited access, language barriers or cultural norms that restrict communication. Relying on digital methods for data collection in regions with limited or insecure internet access may also exclude some stakeholders, particularly those in rural or under-resourced areas.

Endnotes

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